Just Deserts

I was thinking of responding to this post of Megan’s, on irresponsible homeowners, but opted not to. Happily, Felix Salmon says many of the things I was going to say. But Megan writes back again:

On the other hand, there is a proposal on the table to make the homeowners partially whole on their losses by writing down their mortgage interest rates, at the expense of the banks who lent them money.  In the context of that argument, a number of people seem to be making the argument that the homeowners really deserve a large transfer from the banks, because it was the fault of the banks that they lent them money in the first place.

I actually can’t think of anyone who believes that homeowners deserve a rescue, or deserve a large transfer from the banks. Similarly, I can’t think of anyone who thinks the banks deserve a rescue, or deserve a large transfer from taxpayers. The logic behind the rescues isn’t to address some injustice somewhere, but to prevent a crisis from growing ever worse.

At the same time, I think it’s appropriate to defend homeowners generally from people like Rick Santelli, who think the rescue is somehow an invalid instance of government intervention because the borrowers in trouble acted irresponsibly. That’s true of some, but not most buyers. This is why I made the point that if you bought in 2005 or 2006 (and in some places in 2004) you’re underwater, even if you put down 20% of the value of the home. A great many households have lost a great deal of money, putting housing markets in a condition that continues to undermine the economy, despite acting in ways that are generally considered appropriate or laudable — buying homes putting down 20% out of personal savings.

Comments

  1. A great many households have lost a great deal of money, putting housing markets in a condition that continues to undermine the economy, despite acting in ways that are generally considered appropriate or laudable — buying homes putting down 20% out of personal savings.

    One could say the exact same thing, only exchange the concept of housing with stocks:

    A great many households have lost a great deal of money, putting stock markets in a condition that continues to undermine the economy, despite acting in ways that are generally considered appropriate or laudable — buying index funds and staying diversified.

    If one supports rescuing homeowners who followed the rules of thumb but are now underwater, wouldn’t one also have to support rescuing stock purchasers that followed the rules of thumb but are now underwater?

  2. ryan says:

    You make the same error as Megan. Homeowners aren’t getting a rescue because they suffered losses. They’re getting a rescue because their losses are killing the economy. The impact of the decline in equity values is not nearly as significant (see: difference in severity of tech bust recession and this recession).

  3. Doug says:

    I hear a lot of arguments in favor of the transfer from banks to homeowners to redress “predatory lending,” which seems to be defined as “lending.” Nonetheless, containing the contagion is a sound argument for intervention.

    The problem that I see is that the government is, in some ways, pretending the counterparties are banks and homeowners. Given that the crisis has two hosts, the real estate market and the credit market, there’s a pareto problem. I don’t see how you can transfer between the two and get a good result. Crunching down mortgages might make the real estate market come back, but it almost has to worsen the financial market, which will probably feed back into the real estate market before long.

    If the government is going to solve this, the counterparties should be homeowners and banks on one side and the government on the other. John McCain’s housing plan was terribly inefficient, but probably better than pushing cash back and forth between the sectors. The part of the current plan I think I like is the idea of government writing guarantees or otherwise subsidizing a reduction in rates so the banks can be made wholer as well as homeowners.

  4. Homeowners aren’t getting a rescue because they suffered losses. They’re getting a rescue because their losses are killing the economy.

    Okay, that insight helps. Not to harp on the moral hazard canard, but is there ever a time when decreasing housing prices wouldn’t be bad for the economy and therefore necessitate a homeowner rescue? I doubt you’re suggesting this, but how does this not lead to the government ensuring that housing prices always rise? I must be misunderstanding something…

  5. ryan says:

    Individual markets suffer downturns all the time without causing a nationwide crash and making a federal rescue a necessity. It’s the national scope of the crash, and the financial fallout, that’s problematic.

    At any rate, the government is likely to tighten the regulatory framework when this is all said and done, making the kind of bubble we saw far less likely to take place.

  6. At any rate, the government is likely to tighten the regulatory framework when this is all said and done, making the kind of bubble we saw far less likely to take place.

    Provided it’s not overly burdensome and appropriately targeted, this seems preferable to by-the-seat-of-our-pants bailouts.

  7. Beige says:

    “This is why I made the point that if you bought in 2005 or 2006 (and in some places in 2004) you’re underwater, even if you put down 20% of the value of the home.”

    But by 2005 the massive housing bubble was so obvious it came with humorous housing bubble t-shirts. I bought my t-shirt in 2005. Better I suppose to buy with a nice conservative loan than get a Real Home Of Genius with a suicide-ninja loan, but still a risky time to buy.

  8. richard says:

    I think the only reason to bail out homeowners is to bailout the economy. The fact is many homeowners did borrow recklessly, just as bank lent recklessly. It does seem that a lot of this is motivated as the commenter above put it: ‘redress “predatory lending,” which seems to be defined as “lending.”’

    A lot of otherwise sensible people started taking on foolish loans (interest only, teaser rates, etc.) because they thought housing was a get rich quick scheme. I live and work in NoVa and go to law school in D.C. at nights and it simply amazing to me how many of my coworkers/fellow students did positively daft things regarding mortgages. But here we are. And the narrative of victimhood is a lot more appealing than a more sober and realistic assessment which would involve telling these people that the acted like idiots.

    But since we are going to do some form of a bailout, I think to the extent it focuses on a principal reduction, the homeowner should only share part of the upside in an eventual sale. Uncle Sam could buy part of the mortgage as a condition for the bank to reduce the mortgage to its principal, and when there is a profit on the sale, the proceeds would be split into thirds.

    One other point that I would like to make, though, it is fashionable these days to call moral hazard overblown or as another commenter pithily put it “a canard.” In normal circumstances I would largely agree. But it does seem that most of the large policy actions that have been enacted with respect to the banks, and are being proposed with respect to homeowners seem to premised on the following formula: be profligate and stupid, get bailed out by the responsible and prudent (who will subsequently have a higher tax burden), and then if things turn around profit from said bailout. I just wonder if we are approaching a critical mass of perverse incentives.